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1. INTRODUCTION
Professor Govier’s reflection on the authority of personal experience raises some
interesting questions about how a highly subjective and individual account of self
and personal experience might associate with a highly social and narrative account
of self and identity. The question is an interesting one because Nagel’s ‘what it is like
to be a bat’ is a landmark challenge to materialist theories of consciousness while
epistemic privilege and Standpoint Theory are clear challenges to individualized
and asocial theories of consciousness. Prof. Govier’s argument seems to be, that the
move from Nagel to Anderson (or any proponent of epistemic privilege) is a
fallacious one. This is because while conscious experience may be unique and
privileged it does not follow that the person who has the experience has privileged
epistemic access to matters related to the content of the experience. As Prof. Govier
writes, “it is a fallacy to infer from a claim of uniqueness in Nagel’s sense that the
experiencing subject is in the best position (an authority position) to know some
further matter, [or has] epistemic privilege, or merits epistemic deference on such a
matter. That obviously extends to issues of public policy.”
Professor Govier considers whether or not a survivor of rape for instance,
has any epistemic authority beyond a privileged access to the qualia of her own
experience. In line with Mariane Janack (1997), Prof. Govier agrees that it is right to
take the testimony of ‘victims’ and the oppressed seriously so as to counter a social
history that may have downplayed or ignored such testimony. However Prof. Govier
argues that it is a fallacy to infer from a claim of subjective uniqueness that a subject
has any unique political or moral authority on matters related to their first-hand
experience. A rape survivor for instance, may know uniquely what it is like, for her,
to have lived through a rape. However according to Prof. Govier that does not mean
that the rape survivor is in any authoritative epistemic position with regard to the
moral and political dimensions having to do with acts of rape. Thus appeals to the
authority of personal experience when the matter at hand is a moral or political
issue are illegitimate, according to Professor Govier.
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2. SELF AND AUTHORITY
I both agree and disagree with Prof. Govier’s conclusion mostly because of what I
see as these competing notions of ‘self’ and consciousness at play in the argument. I
suggest distinguishing between these two notions so as to draw out the fallacious
elements in the first sense while proposing a legitimate non-fallacious
interpretation in the second.
The first sense in line with Nagel argues that self is equated with a unique
singular consciousness replete with qualia that are inaccessible to any other being.
This kind of ‘self’ is wholly subjective and as Govier puts it “knowing what it is like
[in this sense] is both huge and very small.” Huge, I assume, because it is a vast
seemingly immaterial terrain wholly unknowable to others which nevertheless
constitutes what it is like to be ourselves, and very small because it yields very little
in terms of epistemic authority regarding matters beyond subjective qualia. I agree
that it is fallacious to infer from this sense of self and personal testimony any
authority regarding matters moral or political.
However the secondary sense of self and consciousness that seems to run
through the argument is consistent with epistemic privilege and feminist Standpoint
Theory. On this conception, the self emerges through a collective, narrative
interaction with other selves who are similarly situated. Here the issue is not ‘what
it is like to be me’ in the sense of qualia but rather ‘what is it like to be one of us’ in
the sense of shared experiences of injustice and marginalization. This self is
necessarily collective because it relies on group identification as well as a transition
from individual psychological experiences of self to a social and political view of self
in relation to others. The valium addicted housewife of the 1960s chronicled in
Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique who wound up in a consciousness raising
group in the 1970s learned that what she mistakenly took to be her personal failings
and frustrations were in fact shared by countless numbers of women and were
shaped by a history of oppression and patriarchy. The self that emerged was
necessarily a synthesis of personal testimony and collective understanding. The self
in this sense then is relationally constructed rather than individually and
immaterially determined.
Looking more specifically at the matter of rape, consider philosopher Susan
Brison, who in her 2002 book Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of Self
chronicles her efforts to ‘remake’ her self after surviving a rape. Brison writes, “An
interesting result of group therapy with trauma survivors is that one comes to have
greater compassion for one’s earlier self by empathizing with others who
experienced similar traumas. This means you stop blaming yourself by realizing that
others who acted or reacted similarly are not blameworthy. Rape survivors, who
typically have difficulty getting angry with their assailants find that in group therapy
they are able to get angry on their own behalf by first getting angry on behalf of
others.” (p. 30) For Brison, the self that she was able to remake after the violence
and trauma was necessarily embodied and relational as opposed to immaterial and
inaccessibly subjective. Could this kind of self have non-fallacious epistemic
privilege or authority on moral and political matters of rape? I would argue that it
can and should.
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In a recent Op-Ed piece arguing for the reauthorization of the Violence
Against Women Act in the U.S., Brison said, “Before my trial, I overhead the
prosecutor and my lawyer labeling rapes "nasty" or "nice" and agreeing that mine
was a "nasty" one. Our society is still so ridden with victim blaming and denial that
most survivors of rape and domestic violence don't even report their abuse for fear
that they won't be believed or assisted. Those who do all too rarely see justice done
(Brison, 2012).” Here Brison is not appealing to her authority as an academic or a
philosopher but as a survivor of rape. Should that lend a particular credibility and
privilege to her claims on VAWA legislation? I would argue that it can and should.
Brison developed her perspective not simply because she was raped. Rather, in line
with epistemic privilege and standpoint theory, it was something she earned after
doing the work or remaking her self in relation to others who survived. Her
perspective on the potential impact of the legislation, on the misperceptions of rape,
and the experience of being a rape survivor afford her insights not available to
either her lawyers or seemingly, many politicians and legislators. I would maintain
that this is in part due to the implicit gender biases and sexual stereotypes that are
often invisible to those with social power and privilege. The standpoint of the
survivor helps to reveal biases not seen by those who have never faced the trauma.
Professor Govier agreeing with Janack also makes the point that “They [the
oppressed] often disagree with each other, which is another problem if one is going
to deem them authoritative.” However the fact that two experts disagree for
example, is not reason to discount their expertise. It may be a reason to reduce our
confidence in either experts’ opinion but it does not undermine their overall
authority so I wonder why it should be a factor when considering epistemic
privilege.
3. CONCLUSION
For these reasons I would agree with Prof. Govier that making an inference from
Nagel’s subjective qualia to a socially constructed and relational theory of self, like
those proposed by standpoint theorists, would be fallacious. But I disagree that
inferring epistemic privilege based on a relational theory of self, stemming from
trauma or oppression, is fallacious. I suggest that such a move can and should be a
legitimate appeal to authority and relevant first-hand personal testimony.
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